A Formal Approach to Constructing Secure Air Vehicle Software

Darren Cofer, Andrew Gacek, John Backes, Michael W. Whalen, Lee Pike, Adam Foltzer, Michal Podhradsky, Gerwin Klein, Ihor Kuz, June Andronick, Gernot Heiser, Douglas Stuart

Research output: Contribution to specialist publicationArticle

13 Scopus citations

Abstract

Current approaches to cyberresiliency rely on patching systems after a vulnerability is discovered. What is needed is a clean-slate, mathematically based approach for building secure software. We developed new tools based on formal methods for building software for unmanned air vehicles that is provably secure against cyberattacks.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages14-23
Number of pages10
Volume51
No11
Specialist publicationComputer
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 2018

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
This work was funded by DARPA contract FA8750-12-9-0179. The views, opinions, and/or findings expressed are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as representing the official views or policies of the Department of Defense or the US government.

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