A test of stability in a linear altruism model

Christos A. Ioannou, Shi Qi, Aldo Rustichini

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

Linear altruism predicts the estimated preferences to be independent of the subject's position in the game, if the role allocation is randomly determined, because subjects, in each role, have the same preferences ex ante. We test and reject this hypothesis.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)85-89
Number of pages5
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume121
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 2013

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
The research was supported in part by research funds from the Florida State University , the Strategic Research Development Fund of the University of Southampton and the British Academy under grant number SG110905 to Christos A. Ioannou.

Keywords

  • Linear altruism
  • QRE
  • Trust game

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