Chisholm's paradox and conditional oughts

Catharine Saint Croix; Richmond H. Thomason

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-08615-6_15

Chisholm's paradox and conditional oughts

Catharine Saint Croix, Richmond H. Thomason

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

6 Scopus citations

Abstract

Since it was presented in 1963, Chisholm's paradox has attracted constant attention in the deontic logic literature, but without the emergence of any definitive solution. We claim this is due to its having no single solution. The paradox actually presents many challenges to the formalization of deontic statements, including (1) context sensitivity of unconditional oughts, (2) formalizing conditional oughts, and (3) distinguishing generic from nongeneric oughts. Using the practical interpretation of 'ought' as a guideline, we propose a linguistically motivated logical solution to each of these problems, and explain the relation of the solution to the problem of contrary-to-duty obligations.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	Deontic Logic and Normative Systems - 12th International Conference, DEON 2014, Proceedings
Publisher	Springer Verlag
Pages	192-207
Number of pages	16
ISBN (Print)	9783319086149
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-08615-6_15
State	Published - 2014
Externally published	Yes
Event	12th International Conference on Deontic Logic and Normative Systems, DEON 2014 - Ghent, Belgium Duration: Jul 12 2014 → Jul 15 2014

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume	8554 LNAI
ISSN (Print)	0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)	1611-3349

Conference

Conference	12th International Conference on Deontic Logic and Normative Systems, DEON 2014
Country/Territory	Belgium
City	Ghent
Period	7/12/14 → 7/15/14

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10.1007/978-3-319-08615-6_15

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Saint Croix, C., & Thomason, R. H. (2014). Chisholm's paradox and conditional oughts. In Deontic Logic and Normative Systems - 12th International Conference, DEON 2014, Proceedings (pp. 192-207). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 8554 LNAI). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-08615-6_15

Chisholm's paradox and conditional oughts. / Saint Croix, Catharine; Thomason, Richmond H.
Deontic Logic and Normative Systems - 12th International Conference, DEON 2014, Proceedings. Springer Verlag, 2014. p. 192-207 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 8554 LNAI).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Saint Croix, C & Thomason, RH 2014, Chisholm's paradox and conditional oughts. in Deontic Logic and Normative Systems - 12th International Conference, DEON 2014, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 8554 LNAI, Springer Verlag, pp. 192-207, 12th International Conference on Deontic Logic and Normative Systems, DEON 2014, Ghent, Belgium, 7/12/14. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-08615-6_15

Saint Croix C, Thomason RH. Chisholm's paradox and conditional oughts. In Deontic Logic and Normative Systems - 12th International Conference, DEON 2014, Proceedings. Springer Verlag. 2014. p. 192-207. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-08615-6_15

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Chisholm's paradox and conditional oughts

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