Since it was presented in 1963, Chisholm's paradox has attracted constant attention in the deontic logic literature, but without the emergence of any definitive solution. We claim this is due to its having no single solution. The paradox actually presents many challenges to the formalization of deontic statements, including (1) context sensitivity of unconditional oughts, (2) formalizing conditional oughts, and (3) distinguishing generic from nongeneric oughts. Using the practical interpretation of 'ought' as a guideline, we propose a linguistically motivated logical solution to each of these problems, and explain the relation of the solution to the problem of contrary-to-duty obligations.
|Original language||English (US)|
|Title of host publication||Deontic Logic and Normative Systems - 12th International Conference, DEON 2014, Proceedings|
|Number of pages||16|
|State||Published - 2014|
|Event||12th International Conference on Deontic Logic and Normative Systems, DEON 2014 - Ghent, Belgium|
Duration: Jul 12 2014 → Jul 15 2014
|Name||Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)|
|Conference||12th International Conference on Deontic Logic and Normative Systems, DEON 2014|
|Period||7/12/14 → 7/15/14|
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