Coalition formation in fisheries with potential regime shift

Steve Miller, Bruno Nkuiya

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

11 Scopus citations

Abstract

A system can undergo rapid regime shift in which the growth of natural resources suddenly and permanently declines. We examine how the threat of such a shift alters the strategic management of a common pool renewable resource. We consider exogenous and endogenous threats and examine their effects on both incentives to join a coalition and harvest decisions. We find that an exogenous threat of reduced resource growth may cause the coalition to grow in size, and, perhaps of most interest, we identify conditions under which members of the stable coalition reduce harvest while non-members increase harvest in response to the threat. In contrast, an exogenous threat of total stock collapse may destabilize coalitions, resulting in higher harvest from former members, but reduced harvest by non-members. When the threat of either type of shift is endogenous, the threat of regime shift can induce stable coalitions with more than two members. In particular, we identify cases in which the first best (full cooperation) is sustained as an equilibrium outcome. Finally, we find that the relation between the magnitude of the shift and the size of stable coalitions may be negative.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)189-207
Number of pages19
JournalJournal of Environmental Economics and Management
Volume79
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 1 2016

Keywords

  • Dynamic games
  • Partial cooperation
  • Regime shifts
  • Renewable resources
  • Uncertainty

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Coalition formation in fisheries with potential regime shift'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this