TY - GEN
T1 - Cooperation without exploitation between self-interested agents
AU - Damer, Steven
AU - Gini, Maria
PY - 2013/1/1
Y1 - 2013/1/1
N2 - We study how two self-interested agents that play a sequence of randomly generated normal form games, each game played once, can achieve cooperation without being exploited. The agent learns if the opponent is willing to cooperate by tracking the attitude of its opponent, which tells how much the opponent values its own payoff relative to the agent's payoff. We present experimental results obtained against different types of non-stationary opponents. The results show that a small number of games is sufficient to achieve cooperation.
AB - We study how two self-interested agents that play a sequence of randomly generated normal form games, each game played once, can achieve cooperation without being exploited. The agent learns if the opponent is willing to cooperate by tracking the attitude of its opponent, which tells how much the opponent values its own payoff relative to the agent's payoff. We present experimental results obtained against different types of non-stationary opponents. The results show that a small number of games is sufficient to achieve cooperation.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84872795450&partnerID=8YFLogxK
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U2 - 10.1007/978-3-642-33932-5_51
DO - 10.1007/978-3-642-33932-5_51
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84872795450
SN - 9783642339318
T3 - Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing
SP - 553
EP - 562
BT - Intelligent Autonomous Systems 12 - Proceedings of the 12th International Conference, IAS 2012
PB - Springer- Verlag
T2 - 12th International Conference on Intelligent Autonomous Systems, IAS 2012
Y2 - 26 June 2012 through 29 June 2012
ER -