Cooperation without exploitation between self-interested agents

Steven Damer, Maria Gini

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study how two self-interested agents that play a sequence of randomly generated normal form games, each game played once, can achieve cooperation without being exploited. The agent learns if the opponent is willing to cooperate by tracking the attitude of its opponent, which tells how much the opponent values its own payoff relative to the agent's payoff. We present experimental results obtained against different types of non-stationary opponents. The results show that a small number of games is sufficient to achieve cooperation.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationIntelligent Autonomous Systems 12 - Proceedings of the 12th International Conference, IAS 2012
PublisherSpringer- Verlag
Pages553-562
Number of pages10
EditionVOL. 2
ISBN (Print)9783642339318
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2013
Event12th International Conference on Intelligent Autonomous Systems, IAS 2012 - Jeju Island, Korea, Republic of
Duration: Jun 26 2012Jun 29 2012

Publication series

NameAdvances in Intelligent Systems and Computing
NumberVOL. 2
Volume194 AISC
ISSN (Print)2194-5357

Other

Other12th International Conference on Intelligent Autonomous Systems, IAS 2012
CountryKorea, Republic of
CityJeju Island
Period6/26/126/29/12

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