Abstract
In this paper we present a formalization of anonymous games with uncertainty and with incomplete but symmetric information. We show the existence of Cournot-Nash equilibria for such games and also investigate how the equilibrium correspondence changes in response to changes in information.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 35-59 |
| Number of pages | 25 |
| Journal | Journal of Mathematical Economics |
| Volume | 22 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 1993 |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:Correspondence to: Professor M. Ali Khan, Department University, Baltimore, MD 21218, USA. *Preliminary versions of this paper were presented at the Citicorp Seminar Series at Brown University, at the Theory Workshops at Hitotsubashi and Ohio State and at the Far Eastern Meetings of The Econometric Society held at Kyoto in June 1989. We gratefully acknowledge, in particular, the stimulating comments of Bob Anderson, George Borts, John Hillas, Tatsuro Ichiishi, Andreu Mas-Colell, Harl Ryder, Jerry Stein, S. Takekuma, Akira Yamazaki, Rajiv Vohra and the late Stella Dafermos to whose memory this paper is dedicated. Finally, we thank an anonymous Associate Editor for a number of expository suggestions; and Kali Rath and Yeneng Sun for helpful discussions over an extended period. Errors are solely the authors’. This research was supported, in part, by a grant from the NSF to the author listed first.