Cournot-Nash equilibrium distributions of games with uncertainty and imperfect information

M. Ali Khan; Aldo Rustichini

doi:10.1016/0304-4068(93)90029-K

Cournot-Nash equilibrium distributions of games with uncertainty and imperfect information

M. Ali Khan, Aldo Rustichini

Economics (Twin Cities)

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

7 Scopus citations

Abstract

In this paper we present a formalization of anonymous games with uncertainty and with incomplete but symmetric information. We show the existence of Cournot-Nash equilibria for such games and also investigate how the equilibrium correspondence changes in response to changes in information.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	35-59
Number of pages	25
Journal	Journal of Mathematical Economics
Volume	22
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(93)90029-K
State	Published - 1993

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title = "Cournot-Nash equilibrium distributions of games with uncertainty and imperfect information",

abstract = "In this paper we present a formalization of anonymous games with uncertainty and with incomplete but symmetric information. We show the existence of Cournot-Nash equilibria for such games and also investigate how the equilibrium correspondence changes in response to changes in information.",

author = "{Ali Khan}, M. and Aldo Rustichini",

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AU - Rustichini, Aldo

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