Darwinian dynamics and evolutionary game theory

Thomas L. Vincent; Tania L.S. Vincent; Yosef Cohen

doi:10.1080/17513758.2010.526306

Darwinian dynamics and evolutionary game theory

Thomas L. Vincent, Tania L.S. Vincent, Yosef Cohen

Fisheries, Wildlife, and Conservation Biology

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

Evolutionary games, here modelled by systems of ordinary differential equations, encapsulate Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection. An evolutionary game can reach a local minimum, allowing invasion by mutants to drive the system out of its minimum and engender speciation. Games based on optimality considerations do not resist invasion. Nash equilibrium does not resolve to evolutionary stable strategies - mutants can invade existing communities of species.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	215-226
Number of pages	12
Journal	Journal of Biological Dynamics
Volume	5
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1080/17513758.2010.526306
State	Published - May 2011

Keywords

Evolutionary games
Population dynamics
Tutorial

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Darwinian dynamics and evolutionary game theory

Abstract

Keywords

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