Don't clog the queue! Circuit clogging and mitigation in P2P anonymity schemes

Jon McLachlan, Nicholas Hopper

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

9 Scopus citations

Abstract

At Oakland 2005, Murdoch and Danezis described an attack on the Tor anonymity service that recovers the nodes in a Tor circuit, but not the client. We observe that in a peer-to-peer anonymity scheme, the client is part of the circuit and thus the technique can be of greater significance in this setting. We experimentally validate this conclusion by showing that "circuit clogging" can identify client nodes using the MorphMix peer-to-peer anonymity protocol. We also propose and empirically validate the use of the Stochastic Fair Queueing discipline on outgoing connections as an efficient and low-cost mitigation technique.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationFinancial Cryptography and Data Security - 12th International Conference, FC 2008, Revised Selected Papers
Pages31-46
Number of pages16
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 27 2008
Event12th International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security, FC 2008 - Cozumel, Mexico
Duration: Jan 28 2008Jan 31 2008

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume5143 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Other

Other12th International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security, FC 2008
CountryMexico
CityCozumel
Period1/28/081/31/08

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Don't clog the queue! Circuit clogging and mitigation in P2P anonymity schemes'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this