TY - CHAP
T1 - Feedback in voluntary contribution mechanisms
T2 - An experiment in team production
AU - Croson, Rachel T.A.
PY - 2001/1/1
Y1 - 2001/1/1
N2 - Alchian and Demsetz's (1972) classic paper models team production as a public good. They claim detection of individual effort levels, rather than aggregate effort levels, reduces shirking (free riding). This chapter experimentally tests this claim. Participants are informed either about the individual contributions of others on their team or only about their team's total contribution. Average group contributions in the two treatments are the same. However, group contributions under individual feedback have a significantly higher variance than those under total feedback. Implications of these results for team production are discussed.
AB - Alchian and Demsetz's (1972) classic paper models team production as a public good. They claim detection of individual effort levels, rather than aggregate effort levels, reduces shirking (free riding). This chapter experimentally tests this claim. Participants are informed either about the individual contributions of others on their team or only about their team's total contribution. Average group contributions in the two treatments are the same. However, group contributions under individual feedback have a significantly higher variance than those under total feedback. Implications of these results for team production are discussed.
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U2 - 10.1016/S0193-2306(01)08005-X
DO - 10.1016/S0193-2306(01)08005-X
M3 - Chapter
AN - SCOPUS:14944340979
SN - 0762307021
SN - 9780762307029
T3 - Research in Experimental Economics
SP - 85
EP - 97
BT - Research in Experimental Economics
PB - JAI Press
ER -