I don't think so: Pinker on the mentalese monopoly

David Cole

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

5 Scopus citations

Abstract

Stephen Pinker sets out over a dozen arguments in The language instinct (Morrow, New York, 1994) for his widely shared view that natural language is inadequate as a medium for thought. Thus he argues we must suppose that the primary medium of thought and inference is an innate propositional representation system, mentalese. I reply to the various arguments and so defend the view that some thought essentially involves natural language. I argue mentalese doesn't solve any of the problems Pinker cites for the view that we think in natural language. So I don't think I think the way he thinks I think.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)283-295
Number of pages13
JournalPhilosophical Psychology
Volume12
Issue number3
StatePublished - Jan 1 1999

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