Abstract
Stephen Pinker sets out over a dozen arguments in The language instinct (Morrow, New York, 1994) for his widely shared view that natural language is inadequate as a medium for thought. Thus he argues we must suppose that the primary medium of thought and inference is an innate propositional representation system, mentalese. I reply to the various arguments and so defend the view that some thought essentially involves natural language. I argue mentalese doesn't solve any of the problems Pinker cites for the view that we think in natural language. So I don't think I think the way he thinks I think.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 283-295 |
Number of pages | 13 |
Journal | Philosophical Psychology |
Volume | 12 |
Issue number | 3 |
State | Published - Jan 1 1999 |