Abstract
This paper studies the interaction of error and information both in a single-person setting and in an interactive setting. In contrast to Blackwell's Theorem, which says that more information is always good, the perspective of this paper is that while a lot of information is beneficial, a little information can be harmful. The main achievements of this paper are: (1) A characterization of the class of signals which always benefit a decision-maker in all decision problems. The analysis is carried out in a model which allows for the possibility that the decision-maker makes a mistake. (2) A demonstration that there are public signals within this class which can nevertheless reduce the utility of a team (i.e., a collection of agents wit a common objective), as well as a characterization of the clas of signals which always benefit a team in every team game. (3) A theorem that shows that in decision problems, beyond a certain threshold of precision, the value of information is increasing in the precision of signals, and which also provides a characterization of this threshold.
Original language | English (US) |
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Title of host publication | Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge - Proceedings of the Tenth Conference, TARK 2005 |
Editors | R. Meyden |
Pages | 5-21 |
Number of pages | 17 |
State | Published - Dec 1 2005 |
Event | Tenth Conference on the Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge, TARK 2005 - Singapore, Singapore Duration: Jun 10 2005 → Jun 12 2005 |
Other
Other | Tenth Conference on the Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge, TARK 2005 |
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Country/Territory | Singapore |
City | Singapore |
Period | 6/10/05 → 6/12/05 |