Abstract
While much has been written about inter-jurisdictional competition for tax revenues, especially concerning the choice between harmonization and competition, the literature has largely ignored intra-jurisdiction issues. The few articles examining this issue focus on how lower level governmental entities react to the tax decisions of a national government. However, in some instances, multiple co-equal taxing authorities might share the same base. These bodies face a dilemma over whether to harmonize their policies or to compete. We present a simple model of revenue maximizing tax authorities and derive the conditions under which harmonization dominates competition.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 387-395 |
Number of pages | 9 |
Journal | Constitutional Political Economy |
Volume | 16 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Dec 2005 |
Keywords
- Commons
- Federalism
- Harmonization
- Rent-seeking
- Tax