Intra-jurisdictional tax competition

Jonathan Klick, Francesco Parisi

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

7 Scopus citations


While much has been written about inter-jurisdictional competition for tax revenues, especially concerning the choice between harmonization and competition, the literature has largely ignored intra-jurisdiction issues. The few articles examining this issue focus on how lower level governmental entities react to the tax decisions of a national government. However, in some instances, multiple co-equal taxing authorities might share the same base. These bodies face a dilemma over whether to harmonize their policies or to compete. We present a simple model of revenue maximizing tax authorities and derive the conditions under which harmonization dominates competition.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)387-395
Number of pages9
JournalConstitutional Political Economy
Issue number4
StatePublished - Dec 1 2005


  • Commons
  • Federalism
  • Harmonization
  • Rent-seeking
  • Tax

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