Abstract
Informally, a communication protocol is sender k - anonymous if it can guarantee that an adversary, trying to determine the sender of a particular message, can only narrow down its search to a set of k suspects. Receiver k-anonymity places a similar guarantee on the receiver: an adversary, at best, can only narrow down the possible receivers to a set of size k. In this paper we introduce the notions of sender and receiver k-anonymity and consider their applications. We show that there exist simple and efficient protocols which are k-anonymous for both the sender and the receiver in a model where a polynomial time adversary can see all traffic in the network and can control up to a constant fraction of the participants. Our protocol is provably secure, practical, and does not require the existence of trusted third parties. This paper also provides a conceptually simple augmentation to Chaum's DC-NETS that adds robustness against adversaries who attempt to disrupt the protocol through perpetual transmission or selective non-participation.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 122-130 |
Number of pages | 9 |
Journal | Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 2003 |
Event | Proceedings of the 10th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2003 - Washington, DC, United States Duration: Oct 27 2003 → Oct 31 2003 |
Keywords
- Anonymity
- Anonymous Communication
- Cryptographic Protocols
- Multiparty Computation
- Privacy
- Untraceable Communication