Abstract
In his Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft, Kant claims that chemistry is a science, but not a proper science (like physics), because it does not adequately allow for the application of mathematics to its objects. This paper argues that the application of mathematics to a proper science is best thought of as depending upon a coordination between mathematically constructible concepts and those of the science. In physics, the proper science that exhausts the a priori knowledge of objects of the outer sense, only motions and concepts reducible to motions can be legitimately coordinated with mathematical constructions. Since chemistry can neither achieve its own a priori principles of coordination nor be reduced to the coordinated doctrine of motion, it is a merely improper science.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 393-418 |
Number of pages | 26 |
Journal | Kantian Review |
Volume | 19 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Sep 30 2014 |
Externally published | Yes |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© © Kantian Review 2014.
Keywords
- Kant
- chemistry
- construction
- mathematics
- mechanical philosophy
- proper science