TY - JOUR
T1 - Maximality, duplication, and intrinsic value
AU - Walsh, Sean P
N1 - Copyright:
Copyright 2011 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2011/9
Y1 - 2011/9
N2 - In this paper, I develop an argument for the thesis that 'maximality is extrinsic', on which a whole physical object is not a whole of its kind in virtue of its intrinsic properties. Theodore Sider has a number of arguments that depend on his own simple argument that maximality is extrinsic. However, Peter van Inwagen has an argument in defence of his Duplication Principle that, I will argue, can be extended to show that Sider's simple argument fails. However, van Inwagen's argument fails against a more complex, sophisticated argument that maximality is extrinsic. I use van Inwagen's own commitments to various forms of causation and metaphysical possibility to argue that maximality is indeed extrinsic, although not for the mundane reasons that Sider suggests. I then argue that moral properties are extrinsic properties. Two physically identical things can have different moral properties in a physical world. This argument is a counterexample to a classical ethical supervenience idea (often attributed to G.E. Moore) that if there is identity of physical properties in a physical world, then there is identity in moral properties as well. I argue moral value is 'border sensitive' and extrinsic for Kantians, utilitarians, and Aristotelians.
AB - In this paper, I develop an argument for the thesis that 'maximality is extrinsic', on which a whole physical object is not a whole of its kind in virtue of its intrinsic properties. Theodore Sider has a number of arguments that depend on his own simple argument that maximality is extrinsic. However, Peter van Inwagen has an argument in defence of his Duplication Principle that, I will argue, can be extended to show that Sider's simple argument fails. However, van Inwagen's argument fails against a more complex, sophisticated argument that maximality is extrinsic. I use van Inwagen's own commitments to various forms of causation and metaphysical possibility to argue that maximality is indeed extrinsic, although not for the mundane reasons that Sider suggests. I then argue that moral properties are extrinsic properties. Two physically identical things can have different moral properties in a physical world. This argument is a counterexample to a classical ethical supervenience idea (often attributed to G.E. Moore) that if there is identity of physical properties in a physical world, then there is identity in moral properties as well. I argue moral value is 'border sensitive' and extrinsic for Kantians, utilitarians, and Aristotelians.
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U2 - 10.1111/j.1467-9329.2011.00502.x
DO - 10.1111/j.1467-9329.2011.00502.x
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:80051722805
SN - 0034-0006
VL - 24
SP - 311
EP - 325
JO - Ratio
JF - Ratio
IS - 3
ER -