Measuring information leakage in website fingerprinting attacks and defenses

Shuai Li; Huajun Guo; Nick Hopper

doi:10.1145/3243734.3243832

Measuring information leakage in website fingerprinting attacks and defenses

Shuai Li, Huajun Guo, Nick Hopper

Computer Science and Engineering

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

56 Scopus citations

Abstract

Tor provides low-latency anonymous and uncensored network access against a local or network adversary. Due to the design choice to minimize traffic overhead (and increase the pool of potential users) Tor allows some information about the client’s connections to leak. Attacks using (features extracted from) this information to infer the website a user visits are called Website Fingerprinting (WF) attacks. We develop a methodology and tools to measure the amount of leaked information about a website. We apply this tool to a comprehensive set of features extracted from a large set of websites and WF defense mechanisms, allowing us to make more fine-grained observations about WF attacks and defenses.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	CCS 2018 - Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Publisher	Association for Computing Machinery
Pages	1977-1992
Number of pages	16
ISBN (Electronic)	9781450356930
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1145/3243734.3243832
State	Published - Oct 15 2018
Event	25th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2018 - Toronto, Canada Duration: Oct 15 2018 → …

Publication series

Name	Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
ISSN (Print)	1543-7221

Other

Other	25th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2018
Country/Territory	Canada
City	Toronto
Period	10/15/18 → …

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2018 Association for Computing Machinery.

Keywords

Anonymity
Tor
Website fingerprinting

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10.1145/3243734.3243832

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Li, S., Guo, H., & Hopper, N. (2018). Measuring information leakage in website fingerprinting attacks and defenses. In CCS 2018 - Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (pp. 1977-1992). (Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security). Association for Computing Machinery. https://doi.org/10.1145/3243734.3243832

Measuring information leakage in website fingerprinting attacks and defenses. / Li, Shuai; Guo, Huajun; Hopper, Nick.
CCS 2018 - Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. Association for Computing Machinery, 2018. p. 1977-1992 (Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Li, S, Guo, H & Hopper, N 2018, Measuring information leakage in website fingerprinting attacks and defenses. in CCS 2018 - Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Association for Computing Machinery, pp. 1977-1992, 25th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2018, Toronto, Canada, 10/15/18. https://doi.org/10.1145/3243734.3243832

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Measuring information leakage in website fingerprinting attacks and defenses

Abstract

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Keywords

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