Multi-attribute procurement auctions with risk averse suppliers

Shulin Liu; Jun Li; De Liu

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.099

Multi-attribute procurement auctions with risk averse suppliers

Shulin Liu, Jun Li, De Liu

Information and Decision Sciences

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

14 Scopus citations

Abstract

We analyze multi-attribute procurement auctions with risk-averse suppliers. As the number of suppliers increases or the suppliers become more risk-averse, the equilibrium bidding price decreases under the first-score auction but remains the same under the second-score auction. A buyer prefers the first-score auction.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	408-411
Number of pages	4
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	115
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.099
State	Published - Jun 2012

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
The authors wish to thank Professor Eric Maskin and the anonymous reviewers for valuable comments. This research is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No. 71171052 .

Copyright:
Copyright 2012 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

Keywords

Multi-attribute auctions
Procurement auctions
Risk aversion

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Multi-attribute procurement auctions with risk averse suppliers

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Keywords

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