Mutual information jammer-relay games

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

We consider a two-person zero-sum mutual information game between one jammer (ℑ) and one relay (R), in a non-fading scenario. Supposing that the source (S) and the destination (D) are unaware of the game, we derive optimal pure or mixed strategies for ℑ and TZ depending on the link qualities and whether the players are active during the S → D channel training. When both ℑ and R have full knowledge of the source signal, the optimal strategies amount to linear jamming (LJ) and linear relaying (LR), respectively. When the S → ℑ and S → R links are noisy, LJ strategies (pure or mixed) are still optimal under LR. In this case, instead of always transmitting with full power as when the S → R link is perfect, R should adjust transmit-power according to its power constraint and the reliability of the source signal it receives.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2007 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing, ICASSP '07
DOIs
StatePublished - Aug 6 2007
Event2007 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing, ICASSP '07 - Honolulu, HI, United States
Duration: Apr 15 2007Apr 20 2007

Publication series

NameICASSP, IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing - Proceedings
Volume3
ISSN (Print)1520-6149

Other

Other2007 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing, ICASSP '07
CountryUnited States
CityHonolulu, HI
Period4/15/074/20/07

Keywords

  • Jammer channel
  • Mutual information
  • Nash equilibrium
  • Relay channel
  • Two-person zero-sum games

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