Abstract
We study the design of mechanisms without money for repeated allocation of resources among competing agents. Such mechanisms are gaining widespread use in allocating computing resources in universities and companies, and also distributing of public goods like vaccines among hospitals and food donations among food banks. We consider repeated allocation mechanisms based on artificial currencies, wherein we first allot each agent a chosen endowment of credits, which they can then use over time to bid for the item in a chosen auction format. Our main contribution is in showing that a simple mechanism, based on a repeated all-pay auction with personalized endowments and static pricing rules, simultaneously guarantees vanishing gains from nontruthful bidding as well as vanishing loss in efficiency. Our work lies at the intersection of dynamic mechanism design and mechanisms without money, and the techniques we develop here may prove of independent interest in these settings.
Original language | English (US) |
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Title of host publication | Web and Internet Economics - 12th International Conference, WINE 2016, Proceedings |
Editors | Adrian Vetta, Yang Cai |
Publisher | Springer Verlag |
Pages | 476-477 |
Number of pages | 2 |
ISBN (Print) | 9783662541098 |
State | Published - 2016 |
Externally published | Yes |
Event | 12th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2016 - Montreal, Canada Duration: Jun 11 2016 → Jul 14 2016 |
Publication series
Name | Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) |
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Volume | 10123 LNCS |
ISSN (Print) | 0302-9743 |
ISSN (Electronic) | 1611-3349 |
Conference
Conference | 12th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2016 |
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Country/Territory | Canada |
City | Montreal |
Period | 6/11/16 → 7/14/16 |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:K. Iyer gratefully acknowledges support from the National Science Foundation under grant CMMI-1462592
Publisher Copyright:
© Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany 2016.