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Optimal shill bidding in the VCG mechanism
Itai Sher
Economics (Twin Cities)
Research output
:
Contribution to journal
›
Article
›
peer-review
6
Scopus citations
Overview
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Dive into the research topics of 'Optimal shill bidding in the VCG mechanism'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.
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Business & Economics
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism
90%
Incentives
30%
Bid
25%
Combinatorial Auctions
24%
Cost Minimization
23%
Submodularity
15%
Multiple Identities
14%
Winner Determination
14%
Efficient Allocation
11%
Auctions
8%
Characterization
7%
Decision Maker
6%