TY - JOUR
T1 - Public trust and government betrayal
AU - Phelan, Christopher
PY - 2006/9
Y1 - 2006/9
N2 - This study presents a simple model of government reputation (in which government type cannot be directly observed by households) with the variation that government type, rather than being permanent, follows an exogenous Markov process. This formulation captures three characteristics of bad policy outcomes: governments which betray public trust do so erratically, public trust is regained only gradually after a betrayal, and governments with recent betrayals betray with higher probability than other governments.
AB - This study presents a simple model of government reputation (in which government type cannot be directly observed by households) with the variation that government type, rather than being permanent, follows an exogenous Markov process. This formulation captures three characteristics of bad policy outcomes: governments which betray public trust do so erratically, public trust is regained only gradually after a betrayal, and governments with recent betrayals betray with higher probability than other governments.
KW - Government reputation
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=33748036073&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=33748036073&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.jet.2005.03.003
DO - 10.1016/j.jet.2005.03.003
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:33748036073
SN - 0022-0531
VL - 130
SP - 27
EP - 43
JO - Journal of Economic Theory
JF - Journal of Economic Theory
IS - 1
ER -