Recall and private monitoring

Christopher Phelan; Andrzej Skrzypacz

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2015.02.010

Recall and private monitoring

Christopher Phelan, Andrzej Skrzypacz

Economics (Twin Cities)

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

For a general class of games with private monitoring we show for any finite state strategy (or automaton strategy) with D_i states for players i∈{1,..., N}, if there exists a number of periods t such that it is possible on-path to reach any joint state from any joint state in t periods, the strategy is a strict correlated equilibrium only if each player's strategy is a function only of what the player observes in the last D_i-1 periods.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	162-170
Number of pages	9
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	90
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.02.010
State	Published - Mar 1 2015

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Publisher Copyright:
© 2015 Elsevier Inc.

Keywords

Private monitoring
Repeated games

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Recall and private monitoring

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Keywords

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