Rent seeking, protectionism and innovation in the American steel industry

Stefanie Lenway; Randall Morck; Bernard Yeung

doi:10.2307/2235256

Rent seeking, protectionism and innovation in the American steel industry

Stefanie Lenway, Randall Morck, Bernard Yeung

Strategic Management and Entrepreneurship

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

61 Scopus citations

Abstract

Trade protection in a declining industry can cause damages beyond those revealed in the usual trade diagram analysis. Using data on the US steel firms, we show that trade protection in that industry rewards poor performance, reduces incentives to innovate, and frustrates the normal Schumpeterian process of creative destruction.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	410-421
Number of pages	12
Journal	Economic Journal
Volume	106
Issue number	435
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.2307/2235256
State	Published - Mar 1996

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Rent seeking, protectionism and innovation in the American steel industry

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