Second-price auction tournament

Jason F. Shogren; Gregory M. Parkhurst; Christopher McIntosh

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2006.01.020

Second-price auction tournament

Jason F. Shogren, Gregory M. Parkhurst, Christopher McIntosh

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

6 Scopus citations

Abstract

We compare bidding behavior in a standard second-price auction and a second-price auction tournament without information on relative rankings. Our results suggest that people bid more sincerely in the tournament setting with a non-linear payoff schedule and incomplete information.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	99-107
Number of pages	9
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	92
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2006.01.020
State	Published - Jul 1 2006
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Auction
Experiments
Tournaments

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title = "Second-price auction tournament",

abstract = "We compare bidding behavior in a standard second-price auction and a second-price auction tournament without information on relative rankings. Our results suggest that people bid more sincerely in the tournament setting with a non-linear payoff schedule and incomplete information.",

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Second-price auction tournament

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Keywords

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