The existence of subgame-perfect equilibrium in continuous games with almost perfect information: A comment

Erzo G.J. Luttmer, Thomas Mariotti

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

6 Scopus citations

Abstract

The existence of subgame-perfect equilibrium in continuous games with almost perfect information is discussed. An example is given of a continuous game with perfect information in which no subgame-perfect equilibrium exists if public randomization is not allowed. It is suggested that the this type of game has nature as an active player and the intrapersonal games for consumers with changing preferences are usually games of this type.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1909-1911
Number of pages3
JournalEconometrica
Volume71
Issue number6
DOIs
StatePublished - 2003

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