Abstract
The legal landscape is changing, adapting to the global market. Differences between legal systems hinder transnational commerce. Countries reduce legal differences through non-cooperative and cooperative adaptation processes that alternatively lead to legal transplantation or harmonization. Switching costs render unification difficult. Cooperation reduces differences to a greater extent but rarely leads to legal unification. In this paper we unveil a paradox of legal harmonization. When switching costs are endogenous, countries engaging in cooperative harmonization may end up with less harmonization than those pursuing non-cooperative strategies.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 367-400 |
Number of pages | 34 |
Journal | Public Choice |
Volume | 132 |
Issue number | 3-4 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Sep 2007 |
Keywords
- Legal change
- Legal harmonization
- Legal transplantation
- Transnational contracts