TY - JOUR
T1 - Theories of commitment, altruism and reciprocity
T2 - Evidence from linear public goods games
AU - Croson, Rachel T.A.
PY - 2007/4/1
Y1 - 2007/4/1
N2 - Theories of commitment, altruism, and reciprocity have been invoked to explain and describe behavior in public goods and social dilemma situations. Commitment has been used to explain behaviors like water conservation and voting. Altruism has been applied to explain contributions to charities and intergenerational transfers and bequests. Reciprocity has been invoked to explain gift exchange and labor market decisions. This paper describes a set of experiments, which distinguish between these competing theories by testing their comparative statics predictions in a linear public goods setting. Results provide strong support for reciprocity theories over either theories of commitment or of altruism. (JEL C9, D64, H41, C72).
AB - Theories of commitment, altruism, and reciprocity have been invoked to explain and describe behavior in public goods and social dilemma situations. Commitment has been used to explain behaviors like water conservation and voting. Altruism has been applied to explain contributions to charities and intergenerational transfers and bequests. Reciprocity has been invoked to explain gift exchange and labor market decisions. This paper describes a set of experiments, which distinguish between these competing theories by testing their comparative statics predictions in a linear public goods setting. Results provide strong support for reciprocity theories over either theories of commitment or of altruism. (JEL C9, D64, H41, C72).
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=33847768097&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=33847768097&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2006.00006.x
DO - 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2006.00006.x
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:33847768097
SN - 0095-2583
VL - 45
SP - 199
EP - 216
JO - Economic Inquiry
JF - Economic Inquiry
IS - 2
ER -
