Abstract
Riker famously theorized that political actors faced with suboptimal outcomes might be able to garner a more desirable one by adding issues to the agenda. To date, limited support for Riker's theory of heresthetics exists, primarily consisting of case studies and anecdotal evidence. We offer a systematic analysis of heresthetical maneuvers in the context of Supreme Court decision making. We argue justices who oppose a potential case outcome may add alternative issues to the record in an effort to restructure the terms of debate. Data from justices' behavior during oral argument support Riker's theory.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 819-830 |
Number of pages | 12 |
Journal | Political Research Quarterly |
Volume | 66 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Dec 2013 |
Keywords
- U.S. Supreme Court
- heresthetics
- judicial politics
- oral arguments