TY - JOUR
T1 - Uriah kriegel and Kenneth williford (eds), self-representational approaches to consciousness
AU - Ford, Jason
PY - 2009/5/1
Y1 - 2009/5/1
N2 - Uriah Kriegel and Kenneth Williford have assembled an impressive collection of articles covering a wide array of positions on self-representational accounts of consciousness. The editors have arranged the articles into four sections, articles in favor of self-representational approaches to consciousness, articles opposing the self-representational approach, connections to related issues: cognition, attention and knowledge, and beyond philosophy: consciousness and self-reference. Robert Van Gulick presents his Higher Order Global State (HOGS) model, which combines the teleopragmatic approach with the Global Workspace approach. Terry Horgan, John Tienson, and George Graham presents the idea that all conscious intentional states have phenomenal, qualitative content. Andrew Brook provides an account of the representational base of consciousness in Chapter 5. David Rudrauf and Antonio Damasio, in Chapter 18 present the biological basis of subjectivity that is feeling, since feelings require subjects who experience those feelings.
AB - Uriah Kriegel and Kenneth Williford have assembled an impressive collection of articles covering a wide array of positions on self-representational accounts of consciousness. The editors have arranged the articles into four sections, articles in favor of self-representational approaches to consciousness, articles opposing the self-representational approach, connections to related issues: cognition, attention and knowledge, and beyond philosophy: consciousness and self-reference. Robert Van Gulick presents his Higher Order Global State (HOGS) model, which combines the teleopragmatic approach with the Global Workspace approach. Terry Horgan, John Tienson, and George Graham presents the idea that all conscious intentional states have phenomenal, qualitative content. Andrew Brook provides an account of the representational base of consciousness in Chapter 5. David Rudrauf and Antonio Damasio, in Chapter 18 present the biological basis of subjectivity that is feeling, since feelings require subjects who experience those feelings.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=67650941298&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=67650941298&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s11023-009-9143-9
DO - 10.1007/s11023-009-9143-9
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:67650941298
SN - 0924-6495
VL - 19
SP - 283
EP - 287
JO - Minds and Machines
JF - Minds and Machines
IS - 2
ER -