Using bidder asymmetry to increase seller revenue

Paul Povel; Rajdeep Singh

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2003.12.003

Using bidder asymmetry to increase seller revenue

Paul Povel, Rajdeep Singh

Administration (CSOM)

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6 Scopus citations

Abstract

We construct the optimal selling mechanism in a pure common value environment with two bidders that are not equally well informed. With an optimal mechanism, the seller benefits from bidder asymmetry: her expected revenue increases if the bidder asymmetry increases.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	17-20
Number of pages	4
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	84
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2003.12.003
State	Published - Jul 1 2004

Keywords

Asymmetric bidders
Auctions
Common value

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Using bidder asymmetry to increase seller revenue

Abstract

Keywords

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