TY - JOUR
T1 - Water, externality and strategic interdependence
T2 - A general equilibrium analysis
AU - Roe, Terry L
AU - Diao, Xinshen
N1 - Copyright:
Copyright 2004 Elsevier Science B.V., Amsterdam. All rights reserved.
PY - 2000
Y1 - 2000
N2 - In a region with shared water aquifers, the use of water by one country becomes an externality to another. A policy to subsidize water is shown to lead to both countries being made worse off. However, such policies tend to receive the support of special interests having water rights, and those in sectors such as agriculture that uses water relatively intensively. A unilateral water tax will reduce own country's GDP and rise GDP in the other country. Only when both countries impose a tax co-operatively, will GDP rise in both countries. Copyright (C) 2000 John Wiley and Sons, Ltd.
AB - In a region with shared water aquifers, the use of water by one country becomes an externality to another. A policy to subsidize water is shown to lead to both countries being made worse off. However, such policies tend to receive the support of special interests having water rights, and those in sectors such as agriculture that uses water relatively intensively. A unilateral water tax will reduce own country's GDP and rise GDP in the other country. Only when both countries impose a tax co-operatively, will GDP rise in both countries. Copyright (C) 2000 John Wiley and Sons, Ltd.
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U2 - 10.1002/(SICI)1099-1328(200003)12:2<149::AID-JID559>3.0.CO;2-K
DO - 10.1002/(SICI)1099-1328(200003)12:2<149::AID-JID559>3.0.CO;2-K
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0034092145
SN - 0954-1748
VL - 12
SP - 149
EP - 167
JO - Journal of International Development
JF - Journal of International Development
IS - 2
ER -