Abstract
Whether it is to be maximized or promoted as the object of a duty of beneficence, well-being is a vitally important notion in ethical theory. Wellbeing is a value, but to play the role it has often been assigned by ethical theory it must also be something we can measure and compare. It is a normative concept, then, but it also seems to have empirical content. Historically, philosophical conceptions of well-being have been responsive to the paired demands for normative and empirical adequacy. However, recent work has yet to pay serious attention to the burgeoning field of well-being research in empirical psychology. This might be because the research is new and unknown, or it might be due to uncertainty about how a philosophical investigation would take such research into account. This chapter offers solutions to both of these problems. It provides an overview of well-being research in empirical psychology. It then uses this overview as part of an argument for an empirical informed account of well-being that we call the Value-Based Life Satisfaction Account.
Original language | English (US) |
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Title of host publication | The Moral Psychology Handbook |
Editors | Doris J |
Place of Publication | Oxford |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Pages | 401-431 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9780191594496 |
ISBN (Print) | 9780199582143 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Sep 1 2010 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© Oxford University Press, 2013.
Keywords
- Eudaimonism
- Hedonism
- Life-satisfaction
- Positive psychology
- Well-being