TY - JOUR
T1 - Well-Being Policy
T2 - What Standard of Well-Being?
AU - Haybron, Daniel M.
AU - Tiberius, Valerie
PY - 2015/1/1
Y1 - 2015/1/1
N2 - This paper examines the norms that should guide policies aimed at promoting happiness or, more broadly, well-being. In particular, we take up the question of which conception of well-being should govern well-being policy (WBP), assuming some such policies to be legitimate. In answer, we lay out a case for 'pragmatic subjectivism': given widely accepted principles of respect for persons, well-being policy may not assume any view of well-being, subjectivist or objectivist. Rather, it should promote what its intended beneficiaries see as good for them: pleasure for hedonists, excellence for Aristotelians, etc. Specifically, well-being policy should promote citizens' 'personal welfare values': those values - and not mere preferences - that individuals see as bearing on their well-being. Finally, we briefly consider how pragmatic subjectivism works in practice. While our discussion takes for granted the legitimacy of well-being policy, we suggest that pragmatic subjectivism strengthens the case for such policy.
AB - This paper examines the norms that should guide policies aimed at promoting happiness or, more broadly, well-being. In particular, we take up the question of which conception of well-being should govern well-being policy (WBP), assuming some such policies to be legitimate. In answer, we lay out a case for 'pragmatic subjectivism': given widely accepted principles of respect for persons, well-being policy may not assume any view of well-being, subjectivist or objectivist. Rather, it should promote what its intended beneficiaries see as good for them: pleasure for hedonists, excellence for Aristotelians, etc. Specifically, well-being policy should promote citizens' 'personal welfare values': those values - and not mere preferences - that individuals see as bearing on their well-being. Finally, we briefly consider how pragmatic subjectivism works in practice. While our discussion takes for granted the legitimacy of well-being policy, we suggest that pragmatic subjectivism strengthens the case for such policy.
KW - ethics
KW - happiness
KW - normative ethics
KW - philosophy of economics
KW - philosophy of science
KW - philosophy of social science
KW - political philosophy
KW - well-being
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84988536181&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84988536181&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1017/apa.2015.23
DO - 10.1017/apa.2015.23
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84988536181
SN - 2053-4477
VL - 1
SP - 712
EP - 733
JO - Journal of the American Philosophical Association
JF - Journal of the American Philosophical Association
IS - 4
ER -