Abstract
Philosophical discussions of information and specificity in biology are now commonplace, but no consensus exists about whether the privileging of genetic causation in investigation and explanation is justified. However, little effort has been expended on understanding practices when scientists experimentally measure information or causal specificity. An example of this type of practice—measuring positional information in gene expression during pattern formation in embryogenesis—shows that biologists are unconcerned with comparing the amount of information in genes with that of other factors. Instead, they focus on whether the measured causal specificity explains the phenomenon under scrutiny.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 1061-1072 |
Number of pages | 12 |
Journal | Philosophy of Science |
Volume | 87 |
Issue number | 5 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Dec 2020 |
Bibliographical note
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