TY - JOUR
T1 - Putting psychology before metaphysics in moral responsibility
T2 - Reactive attitudes and a “gut feeling” that can trigger and justify them
AU - Schroer, Robert
AU - Schroer, Jeanine Weekes
PY - 2019/4/3
Y1 - 2019/4/3
N2 - In “Freedom and Resentment,” P.F. Strawson argues that since the reactive attitudes are psychologically unavoidable, they do not stand in need of justification from philosophical theorizing about the metaphysical conditions necessary for free action. After reviewing and criticizing this line of argument, we develop an alternative account of how the reactive attitudes can be justified through a feature of our psychology. This new account focuses upon a collection of cognitive mechanisms identified by cognitive neuroscience, which recognize human beings (and other minded beings) and which also give rise to a gut feeling that certain entities are possible targets for the reactive attitudes. By focusing on the justificatory power of this gut feeling, we arrive at an account of moral responsibility that places psychology before metaphysics in a manner broadly similar to Strawson’s original account, but in a way that avoids some of the shortcomings of that account.
AB - In “Freedom and Resentment,” P.F. Strawson argues that since the reactive attitudes are psychologically unavoidable, they do not stand in need of justification from philosophical theorizing about the metaphysical conditions necessary for free action. After reviewing and criticizing this line of argument, we develop an alternative account of how the reactive attitudes can be justified through a feature of our psychology. This new account focuses upon a collection of cognitive mechanisms identified by cognitive neuroscience, which recognize human beings (and other minded beings) and which also give rise to a gut feeling that certain entities are possible targets for the reactive attitudes. By focusing on the justificatory power of this gut feeling, we arrive at an account of moral responsibility that places psychology before metaphysics in a manner broadly similar to Strawson’s original account, but in a way that avoids some of the shortcomings of that account.
KW - Cognitive neuroscience
KW - compatibilism
KW - moral responsibility
KW - reactive attitudes
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85058694780&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85058694780&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1080/09515089.2018.1555800
DO - 10.1080/09515089.2018.1555800
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85058694780
SN - 0951-5089
VL - 32
SP - 357
EP - 387
JO - Philosophical Psychology
JF - Philosophical Psychology
IS - 3
ER -