TY - JOUR
T1 - SilentKnock
T2 - Practical, provably undetectable authentication
AU - Vasserman, Eugene Y.
AU - Hopper, Nick
AU - Tyra, James
PY - 2009
Y1 - 2009
N2 - Port knocking is a technique to prevent attackers from discovering and exploiting vulnerable network services, while allowing access for authenticated users. Unfortunately, most work in this area suffers from a lack of a clear threat model or motivation. To remedy this, we introduce a formal security model for port knocking, show how previous schemes fail to meet our definition, and give a provably secure scheme. We also present SilentKnock, an implementation of this protocol that is provably secure under the assumption that AES and a modified version of MD4 are pseudorandom functions, and integrates seamlessly with existing applications.
AB - Port knocking is a technique to prevent attackers from discovering and exploiting vulnerable network services, while allowing access for authenticated users. Unfortunately, most work in this area suffers from a lack of a clear threat model or motivation. To remedy this, we introduce a formal security model for port knocking, show how previous schemes fail to meet our definition, and give a provably secure scheme. We also present SilentKnock, an implementation of this protocol that is provably secure under the assumption that AES and a modified version of MD4 are pseudorandom functions, and integrates seamlessly with existing applications.
KW - Covert authentication
KW - Cryptography
KW - Formal models
KW - Provable security
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U2 - 10.1007/s10207-008-0070-1
DO - 10.1007/s10207-008-0070-1
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:60849106639
SN - 1615-5262
VL - 8
SP - 121
EP - 135
JO - International Journal of Information Security
JF - International Journal of Information Security
IS - 2
ER -